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Reconciliation or Reconstruction?




Over the past decade a substantial literature has emerged on the concept of
political forgiveness and the process of restorative justice. This article argues that
importing an idea of forgiveness into political affairs is a mistake. It is not necessary
for the promotion of peace and security, and it is has been construed in a way that
leans heavily toward Christian conceptions of forgiveness, as is evident in the
influence of Desmond Tutu. The article also examines the influence of Hegelian
recognition theory in current discussions of the political benefits of forgiveness, and
reviews the case of postwar German-Jewish relations, which conformed more
closely to traditional Jewish thinking on forgiveness than to the Christian-Hegelian
(multicultural) model.
Polity (2013) 45, 174–197. doi:10.1057/pol.2013.5; published online 18 March 2013
Keywords forgiveness; reconciliation; restorative justice; German-Jewish relations;
truth commissions; Hegel
The dead are nourished by judgement.—Elias Canetti
We can live together, we just can’t sleep.
– Resident of the former Yugoslavia
In recent years a substantial literature has emerged on the aftermath of conflict
and transitional justice. The period since the end of World War Two is often
characterized as one of growing commitment to restorative justice, as opposed to
the “victors’ justice” of earlier times. Restorative justice underscores the useful-
ness of a variety of gestures and policies which include truth commissions,
statements of apology, restitution efforts of various kinds, and reparations
payments as means of furthering reconciliation. It emphasizes recognition of
wrongdoing, as well as of the full equality of the victims.
Several theorists of restorative justice have sought to define a concept of
political forgiveness. Some are interested in a secular version; others seek to
revive or import a religious notion, especially a Christian one.1 In these
discussions the case of German-Jewish reconciliation after the Second World
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War frequently arises. Thus Roy Brooks, a legal scholar concerned with
reparations for slavery, writes:
. . . Adenauer’s contrition captures the essence of the post-Holocaust spirit of
heightened morality, victim-perpetrator identity, egalitarianism, and restorative
justice. It is a model, a moral blueprint, of how governments today, including
the government of the United States, should respond to redress claims. Indeed,
the United Nations regards Germany’s redress program, which also provided
funds for the new state of Israel, as ‘the most comprehensive and systematic
precedent of reparations by a Government to groups of victims for redress of
wrongs suffered.2
The theorist Elazar Barkan, who has explored a wide range of cases, also treats
the German-Jewish case as a model:
The idea of compensation, the rhetoric of guilt, and limited recognition-
forgiveness were translated, through the legal medium of restitution, into new
possibilities in international relations.3
Perhaps the most important text on this topic is No Future Without Forgiveness,4 in
which Desmund Tutu explicitly takes issue with Jewish ideas and actions in the
aftermath of the Second World War and with the status of Palestine. He also
expresses the hope that Jewish scholars will respond with analyses of their own.
Amid the trend toward restorative justice, the German-Jewish case continues
to resonate. However, the gradual establishment of reparations payments and of
diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of
Israel too often is discussed in the light of notions of reconciliation and political
1. Frequently cited works relating to the topic of forgiveness in politics include: Elazar Barkan, The
Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustice (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2000); Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, ed., Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation
(Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006); Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany
and Japan (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994); Roy Brooks, Atonement and Forgiveness: A New Model
for Black Reparations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Jon Elster, Closing the Books:
Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Amitai
Etzioni and David E. Carney, eds., Repentance: A Comparative Perspective (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997); Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and
Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001); Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2002); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After
Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998). A useful overview of some of the literature
may also be found in Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir, ed., The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural
Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
2. Brooks, Atonement, xv.
3. Barkan, Guilt of Nations, xxiii.
4. Desmond Mpilo Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1997).
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forgiveness that have been imported retroactively either from the South African
case or as a result of broad aspirations for multicultural harmony. Such discus-
sions have therefore tended to distort what occurred during the German-Jewish
rapprochement and the policy inferences that might be drawn from it.
In this article I argue that in the paradigm case of German-Jewish relations
after the Second World War, recognition of the moral wrong done to Jews, to
Jewish identity, and to Jewish memory and the processes of apology, forgiveness,
and reconciliation either were not present at all, or were at best secondary for all
parties involved in the negotiations over reparations and restitution. I cannot
analyze other cases here because of space constraints. Still, I believe that they
also show that economic and power-political considerations are primary in the
“reconciliation” process. Indeed, a strong case could be made that this happened
in Tutu’s South Africa.
I hold, further, that what occurred in the German-Jewish case was not
reconciliation predicated on forgiveness. It was a process of constructing
conditions for basic security. The goal of social and political reconstruction
differs from that of forgiveness and reconciliation, though the former may provide
a basis for the latter. Nonetheless, working toward reconstruction—economically,
socially and politically—should not be viewed as only a mundane and
materialistic affair. The aim of reconstruction is to put in place a “minimally
decent society.”5 This is valuable in itself, even though it is quite different from
seeking to re-create (through apologies, truth commissions, and other processes
thought to facilitate forgiveness), a society in which everyone can behave as
though nothing had happened.
In my view, the choice to forgive should be left to the individual and her
“comprehensive view” of morality. Forgiveness is not a value chosen or a decision
taken on one’s behalf by the state or a representative of the state. It remains
outside the sphere of the political, and no special concept of “political
forgiveness” is desirable. Thus, even though I shall suggest that a Jewish
conception of forgiveness would be more applicable to postwar German-Jewish
relations than some others, it is preferable to avoid the term “forgiveness”
altogether in the political sphere.
Approaches to Forgiveness in Politics
Although the Holocaust in many ways has become a paradigm case, analyses
of forgiveness have not included a Jewish religious perspective. Indeed, there is
5. Stuart Hampshire cited in Rajeev Bhargava, “Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies,” in Truth v.
Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000), 45–46.
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some disagreement as to whether forgiveness has or requires a religious basis
of any kind.
One of the most frequently cited views on forgiveness is that of Hannah
Arendt. Her status as both German-Jewish refugee and distinguished political
philosopher has given her paradoxical pronouncement on forgiveness an
unusual measure of authority. Arendt’s secular outlook, which sought to
acknowledge the seemingly transcendent enormity of the crimes perpetrated,
was encapsulated in her declaration that “we are unable to forgive what we
cannot punish and we are unable to punish what has turned out to be
unforgiveable.” Mary Dietz has argued that Arendt’s principal concern
both in this formulation and in her broad theoretical investigations of the
Holocaust was to “construct a way back from the abyss” so that Jews could
give up their “fanatical hatred” and so that Germans could rid themselves “of
the complicity imposed by the Nazis.” By conceptualizing political space
anew and providing a new “dream,” Arendt, like Thucydides, sought to “block
the human impulse to ruminate upon and incessantly rekindle the perpetual
memory of hardship and evil, thereby fanning the flames of desire for
retribution and revenge.”6
Apart from the absence of evidence to support the notion that there was
widespread desire for revenge among Jews anywhere, the noteworthy point
about Arendt’s view—or Dietz’s interpretation of it—is that it was among the
earliest to see forgiveness as a humanly constructed, step-by-step procedure or
process which could be enacted for the larger political purpose of achieving
peace. More recently, similar views may be found in the work of P.E. Digeser, who
argues for a view of forgiveness along the lines of debt forgiveness in commerce.
That is, after some suitable procedure of acknowledgment of wrongdoing and
efforts to make restitution on the part of the debtor, the creditor or victim will
move toward re-establishing friendly relations or reconciliation. Legal or civic
authorities would specify the procedure to be followed.7 Donald Shriver has
proposed a similar method.8 This contrasts to some extent with other views,
especially religious ones, which emphasize the instantaneous, even gratuitous,
character of forgiveness, either divine or human. In this way of thinking,
forgiveness, though it may require apology and atonement in some form, is
ultimately a matter of “grace,” an inexplicable, uncalculating emotional move-
ment toward the perpetrator, who has not necessarily made an effort to seek
forgiveness.
6. Mary Dietz, “Arendt and the Holocaust,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed.
Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 92.
7. P. E. Digeser, Political Forgiveness (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), passim.
8. Donald W. Shriver, Jr., An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
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As we shall see in the next section, the view of forgiveness as a method to
obtain peace is more or less that of Desmond Tutu, as well as the Jewish thinker
Vladimir Jankelevitch.9 Other conceptions, including Jewish religious ones, tend
to emphasize the repentance which should take place before forgiveness, not
only on an individual level but in public life. The legal theorist Jeffrie Murphy, in a
volume on civic repentance organized by the communitarian thinker Amitai
Etzioni, writes:
We simply do not value repentance the way we once did; and the world has
suffered a loss thereby. [It is] seen as a vestigial relic of a religious world view
to which most people pay only lip service. Or they do not see its relevance to
crime and punishment defined around secular values.10
I agree that in secular accounts of political forgiveness, repentance has been
largely reduced to formal governmental apology. Such apologies by national
leaders may be helpful in post-conflict or post-trauma reconciliation; but it is
difficult to determine whether such apologies express broad and deep processes
of repentance and forgiveness within a society more generally.
Influence of Christian Thought and of Hegel
The current aspiration to achieve social reconciliation through forgiveness and
recognition of “the other,” perhaps even to the point of vitiation of meaningful
distinctions between victims and perpetrators, has, two sources: the Christian
theology underlying the renowned South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, and the Hegelian underpinnings of contemporary multicultural
theory. Although Christianity is often mentioned as shaping the South African
truth commission, one rarely sees discussion of Archbishop Tutu’s own words and
his possibly relevant comments on Jews and Judaism. I begin, however, with the
Hegelian-philosophical aspect of this point, since its possible influence on
thinking about political reconciliation has received even less attention.11
The nineteenth-century German Idealist philosopher G.W.F. Hegel placed great
weight on the notion that individuals—whether particular human beings, whole
societies, or even Absolute Being itself—can fully actualize themselves only if
9. Vladimir Jankelevitch. Forgiveness, trans. Andrew Kelley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005).
10. Jeffrie Murphy, “Repentance, Punishment and Mercy,” in Repentance: A Comparative Perspective,
ed. Amitai Etzioni and David E. Carney (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 146.
11. Two important exceptions should be noted: the volume edited by Kymlicka and Bashir cited in
note 1 above, and Michael Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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they are recognized by other individuals from whom they have become
differentiated.12 Restitution processes represent, for a number of theorists, a step
toward fulfillment of the need for recognition in the contemporary era:
A theory of conflict resolution based on restitution may illuminate the effort by
many nations and minorities to gain partial recognition and overcome
conflicting historical identities through construction of a shared past.13
The locus classicus of the phenomenon of recognition is Hegel’s master-slave
zdialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit. But while contemporary multi-
culturalism and recognition theory look toward to a condition of full equality
and liberal democracy, Hegel’s version of the dialectic closes with the
subsiding of one of the parties into awareness of his own finitude and a
resulting acceptance of slavery over death, although initially he was supposed
to be engaged in a struggle to the death.14 Hegel was interested not so much in
the dynamic of recognition of otherness, as theorists of multiculturalism would
have it, but in the nature of self-consciousness and the ability to see oneself in
the other.
Other sections of the Phenomenology restate the relative unimportance
(indeed, the unreality) of essential otherness. Hegel argues in a section on deceit
that both individuality and action are intricate, indecipherable mixtures of good
and bad; that action is in any case all good, because it is the self-expression of
individuality; and that
[t]herefore feelings of exaltation, or lamentation, or repentance are altogether
out of place. For all that sort of thing stems from a mind which imagines a
content and an in-itself which are different from the original nature of the
individual and the actual carrying out of it in the real world.15
Thus he sees the attitude of repentance as rather a waste of time because it
is based on a misrecognition of the other, a false reflection created by the
imagination of the repentant person.
In another section on forgiveness Hegel insists that one who receives a
confession must, like the philosopher reflecting on good and bad, relinquish
judgment. An initial, mutual refusing-to-yield stand-off between offender and
victim must end, not in death, but in reconciliation.
12. Cf. Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy; and Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975).
13. Barkan, Guilt, xli.
14. Cf. Patchen Markell, Bound By Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
15. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 242.
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The consciousness that judges in this way is itself base, because it divides up
the action. . . Further, it is hypocrisy, because it passes off such judging, not as
another manner of being wicked, but as the correct consciousness of the
action, setting itself up in this unreality and conceit of knowing well and better
above the deeds it discredits. . . By putting itself, then, in this way on a level
with the doer on whom it passes judgement, it is recognized by the latter as
the same as himself.
Perceiving this identity and giving utterance to it, he [whose action is being
judged] confesses this to the other, and equally expects that the other. . .will
respond in words in which he will give utterance to this identity with him, and
expects that this mutual recognition will now exist as a fact. His confession is
not an abasement, a humiliation, a throwing away of himself in relation to
the other. . .16
The recognition that takes place is not a recognition of otherness, but a sort of
metaphysical solidarity. Each side discerns in the other the combination of
universality and particularity, objectivity and subjectivity that is present in every
action. That is, the offender/confessing person perceives his identity with
the other not through feelings of guilt, shame, or repentance, but through
something akin to sneering defiance. The evil consciousness confesses and
expects in return a relinquishing of “the weapon” of judgment about good and
evil, and a relinquishing of the “unreal” self of the judging person. Initially, the
judging side—that is, the “beautiful soul” of the person receiving the
confession—fails to see its unity with the other life, and refuses to give up its
judgment. Eventually, however, this hard-heartedness is worn down in some
fashion; the judge comes to see himself in the wicked other, and extends
forgiveness.
The forgiveness which it extends to the other is the renunciation of self, of its
unreal essential being. . . and acknowledges that what thought characterized
as bad, viz. action,—is good; or rather it abandons this distinction of the
specific thought and its subjectively determined judgement. . .17
From here, the two consciousnesses proceed to reconciliation, where no acts or
individuals are divided by thought and judgment, and where the two parties are
unified in the universality of reason or Absolute Spirit.
16. Ibid., 405
17. Ibid., 407–408.
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This process of reconciliation imposes no hardship, in Hegel’s view, because
individual memory disappears:
The wounds of the spirit heal and leave no scar behind. The deed [the crime]
is not imperishable element; it is taken back by Spirit into itself, and the aspect
of individuality in it. . .straightway vanishes.18
Perhaps on the level of a metaphysical self wounds leave no scars, but it is
difficult to conceive how this could be the case after military, political, legal, and
social battles (the very ones Hegel apparently regards as unreal). The need to
receive acknowledgment of wrong (or the need to avoid admitting wrong); the
need for judgment; and the return to a distinctive identity that has been violated
or distorted through conflict—these seem to be ineradicable needs, not parts of
identity that either victims or perpetrators would ever relinquish. These needs
may have been the source of the problems surrounding President Reagan’s visit
to the German military cemetery at Bitburg in 1985. His visit and remarks there
implied a commonality and universality of suffering that vitiated distinctions
between the experiences and identities of victims and perpetrators under the
National Socialist regime. Some restitution theorists may deny that forgiveness
and reconciliation require forgetting or abandonment of judgment, but the
conception of reconciliation laid out by Hegel does require it.19
Tutu’s conception of forgiveness, like Hegel’s, de-emphasizes differences
between perpetrators and victims and stresses “our common humanity.”20 Neither
Hegel (who to some degree was committed to Lutheranism) nor Tutu
acknowledges that a specifically Christian approach to forgiveness may not be
universally applicable. In face of the objection, raised by the President of Rwanda
among others, that certain atrocities are unforgivable, Tutu calls for universal
harmony. He defines “forgiveness” as “abandoning your right to pay back the
perpetrator in his own coin”—that is, as not seeking retribution in the sense of
revenge.21 Forgiveness also means having empathy for the perpetrator; under-
standing what led him to act in the way that he did; and beginning the
relationship anew.22 Ideological and practical differences will arise at the
beginning of a new relationship. Those who see forgiveness—either on behalf of
the dead (if that is possible) or on one’s own account—as a form of social
18. Ibid., 407.
19. My reading differs from that of Michael Hardimon, who argues that Hegelian reconciliation is
not a return to a former condition as though nothing had happened. Cf. Hardimon, Hegel’s Social
Philosophy, 85.
20. Tutu, No Future, 120.
21. Ibid., 272.
22. Ibid.
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amnesia or even a form of injustice will think and act differently from those who
forgive in the way advocated by Archbishop Tutu.
Although Tutu and many other theorists insist that forgiving does not mean
forgetting, others fear that forgiving not only will mean forgetting, but will induce
a failure of recognition. After all, memories of historical wrongs constitute parts of
a people’s particular identity. They therefore are not prepared to commence
behaving as though the former enemy had not acted at all.23
Moreover, Judaism as a religion, and not only as a culture or ethnicity, depends
heavily on memory. God is remembered as the one who made possible the
exodus of the Jews from slavery in Egypt. To set aside this belief about God (and
the corresponding historical narrative) would require abandoning an essential
feature of religious as well as cultural identity. The tight connection between
memory and identity is true of not only Jews in ancient Egypt, but Jews in
twentieth-century Europe, Native Americans, Africans of many kinds in the
postcolonial era, and many other groups.
Tutu castigates the Jewish people for not sharing his vision of forgiveness and
reconciliation:
It is a little difficult for me to understand how it is that Jews should be willing
to accept the substantial compensation being paid out as reparation by
European governments and institutions for complicity in the Holocaust. For if
we accept the argument that they cannot forgive on behalf of those who
suffered and died in the past, logic would seem to dictate that those who did
not suffer directly as a result of the action for which the reparation is being
paid should also be capable of receiving compensation on behalf of others.
Their stance also means that there is still a massive obstacle to the resumption
of more normal and amicable relationships between the community of the
perpetrators and the community of those who were wronged. There will
always be this albatross hanging around the neck of the erstwhile perpetrators,
whatever they might want to do about acts of reparation and whatever new
and better attitudes they might want to bring to the situation.24
“Their stance” (that is, the stance that of “the Jews”) purportedly poses a “massive
obstacle” to resumption of “more normal” relations, as Tutu conceives it. But, as
will be explained below, the Jewish position has not precluded the resumption of
constructive relations altogether. Nor, initially, did large numbers of Germans
(“the erstwhile perpetrators”) seek forgiveness or want to adopt new attitudes,
23. Cf. Robert Gibbs, Why Ethics? Signs of Responsibilities (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2000).
24. Tutu, No Future, 277–78.
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though the German leadership did express that wish. Furthermore, reparation
and restitution payments were not received on behalf of those who had died.
They were received as compensation to survivors unable to work and to
accumulate savings on account of their past “imprisonment” in death and
concentration camps; as restitution, where possible, of identifiable property that
was appropriated by the National Socialist regime for military and police
purposes during the war; and as payments to the State of Israel to assist in the
costs of large-scale immigration of survivors. Although the German government
has paid billions in restitution, the amount that an individual survivor receives is
frequently only a fraction of what is required to live (let alone of what he or she
might have possessed if the Nazi persecution had not taken place).
Jewish Conceptions of Forgiveness
For the sake of completeness, let us inquire as to how forgiveness is under-
stood in Jewish religious thought. There are many reasons to do so. If
reconciliation processes and procedures are to be attempted (as they currently
are), it seems self-evident that all participants should have some preliminary
notion of how their opponents envision reconciliation, and of the extent that
those conceptions have been shaped by religious and cultural traditions rather
than by a more recent and somewhat artificially constructed secular or civic
version. Participants should share some minimal understanding of which
reconciliatory procedures are feasible if not welcome, and should be able to
assess how far reconciliation efforts are actually likely to go.
For example, one concrete step that might have facilitated the reconciliation
process in the German-Jewish case was an explicit and public apology from
Chancellor Adenauer and his government. The Jewish/Israeli demand for such an
apology was not a negotiating tactic. Nor was the demand for an apology a
question of staying in a vengeful frame of mind or “nursing a grudge vicariously
for those who cannot speak for themselves any longer.”25 The demand was a
derivation from the Jewish religious conception of how reconciliation may
proceed. With greater knowledge of the Jewish idea of forgiveness, we will be
able to see better that forgiveness was not required for the return of peaceful,
stable relations between Germany and Israel.
By briefly surveying Jewish ideas about forgiveness, I do not mean to suggest that
they should replace the Christian understanding or any other model of international
and intra-societal reconciliation. I simply wish to note that the conduct of Israeli and
other Jewish representatives in the aftermath of World War II comports more with
traditional Jewish thought on forgiveness than with some putative ideal of universal
25. Ibid., 279.
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harmony. As an alternative to Tutu’s version of forgiveness, the Israeli diplomats
pursued peace yet did not regard the former perpetrator as though he had not acted.
Probably the best-known and most cohesive statement of the Jewish view of
forgiveness is to be found in the Mishneh Torah, a codification produced in the
twelfth century by the philosopher Maimonides. In the section “Laws of
Repentance” (hilchot teshuvah), as elsewhere, Maimonides relied heavily on the
Hebrew Bible and slightly less so on the Talmud, which remains a primary source.
Several branches of Judaism—Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox (itself divided
into a number of sub-groups)—share this view of repentance and forgiveness. The
expositions of two prominent Jewish thinkers: Joseph Soloveitchik (Orthodox) and
Elliott Dorff (Conservative) inform the following interpretation.
Jewish religious thought distinguishes two senses of forgiveness.26 One sense,
seliha, is that of an ineffable form of purification, a spiritual return to God’s
presence. It is preceded by a type of repentance, taharah, which seeks to
overcome the subjective sense of being mired in sin and to remove moral
impurity. A second sense of forgiveness is that of mehila, which is pardon or
acquittal, and a release from debt and further punishments or obligations. Mehila
is preceded by repentance in the sense of kapparah, or performing acts of
material or concrete reparation. Of paramount importance, however, is the
explicit request for forgiveness from the offended party, whether divine or human
(but one cannot ask for divine forgiveness if one has not first sought human
forgiveness). The ability to make such a request is thought to follow from a
turning of the spirit from the habits and actions that led to the offense, and a
turning/returning both toward both a more just mode of behavior and, ideally,
toward God. Such a turning is called teshuvah or “response” to God.
Certain procedures are to be followedwhen one human being seeks forgiveness
from another. For example, the one who seeks forgiveness should ask the victim
(directly) for forgiveness three times in the presence of others. A problem arises, of
course, if the wrong committed is murder, or if the victim has died in some other
way and is not in a position to receive the apology and request for forgiveness. The
Talmud advises the wrongdoer to seek forgiveness over the grave of the victim and
to say: “I have acted wrongly towards you” (Yoma 45c). For others who may have
been affected by the offense or crime of murder, the question remains whether
they can or should respond in a conciliatory way.27
26. Cf. Soloveitchik on Repentance: The Thought and Oral Discourses of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik,
comp. Pinhas Peli (New York: Paulist Press, 1984); Elliott Dorff, To Do the Right and the Good: A Jewish
Approach to Modern Social Ethics (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2002). David Konstan has
argued that historically neither Judaism nor Christianity had a definite conception of interpersonal
forgiveness comparable to those found in the modern era. See his Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a
Moral Idea (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
27. I take this to be the question posed by Simon Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower.
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The Jewish idea of mehila resembles what has recently, in discussions of
reparations for African Americans, been termed the “tort model of redress.” It also
resembles those approaches which treat political forgiveness on analogy with debt
repayment and forgiveness.28 The tort model, though including a demand for
acknowledgment of wrongdoing and apology, primarily seeks rectification of
injustice according to a relatively specific legal scheme of punishments and
compensations. Forgiveness entails the acceptance of the proffered apology,
together with material compensation, for the sake of social peace and stability.
It does not include arriving at “purification” or reconciliation in some larger, more
diffuse sense.
We might say, in accordance with the Jewish conception of repentance and
forgiveness as I have presented it, that Germany has gone some distance in
acquitting itself of its debt to Jews through its compensation payments, its
denazification procedures, its new constitution, and other practical measures.
And to this extent, the world community and perhaps the Jewish community as
well have pardoned Germany. But forgiveness in the sense of seliha will likely
never occur. We have no inkling of divine intention in this regard. On their own
admission, many Germans who were involved in the killing directly or indirectly
have not repented.29 The feeling that moral impurity lingers may account for the
feeling among some that a permanent question mark hangs over German
contributions to the international political community.
Jewish and Christian ideas relating to forgiveness and reconciliation differ in
several respects. First, when the victim cannot respond because he is dead,
Judaism leaves open the question of what surviving family members or the
community should think about forgiveness and reconciliation, though on no
account should revenge be sought. According to Tutu’s view, survivors should
proffer forgiveness in all cases, even when remorse has not been expressed and
forgiveness not requested.30 In Judaism, an explicit request for forgiveness must
be made before it can be considered. It is likely for this reason that Israeli
negotiators insisted on a formal statement of remorse from the Germans before
any further transactions could take place.
Second, the ultimate vision for humanity to which Christian ideas of
forgiveness are supposed to contribute is quite different from Jewish ones. In
Jewish thought, there is no unified conception of an end-state to which humanity
28. Cf. Brooks, Atonement; Digeser, Political Forgiveness.
29. Cf. Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfange der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit
(Munchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999); Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarethe Mitscherlich,
Die Unfahigkeit zu Trauern: Grundlagen des Kollektiven Verhaltens (Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1977);
Hannah Arendt, “The Auschwitz Trial,” in Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn
(New York: Schocken Books, 2003).
30. Tutu, No Future, 272–73.
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is tending. Tutu, in contrast, anticipates an era when all differences between
peoples disappear:
There is a movement, not easily discernible, at the heart of things to reverse
the awful centrifugal force of alienation, brokenness, division, hostility and
disharmony. God has set in motion a centripetal process, a moving toward the
center, toward unity, harmony, goodness, peace and justice, a process that
removes barriers. Jesus[‘s]. . .arms[are] thrown out to clasp all, everyone and
everything, in a cosmic embrace, so that all, everyone, everything, belongs.
None is an outsider, all are insiders, all belong. There are no aliens, all belong
in one family, God’s family, the human family. There is no longer Jew or Greek,
male or female, slave or free. . .31
Jews and Greeks, though not without universalistic tendencies in their own
thought, do not necessarily share this vision.
I now present a brief overview of postwar German-Jewish relations, which I
believe illustrates the Jewish perspective in which the acceptance of material
reparations is a form of debt repayment—that is, forgiveness in the sense of
mehila—but does not entail the granting of forgiveness (in an emotional,
spiritual, or purifying sense) on one’s own behalf or on behalf of the dead.
German-Jewish Relations After 1945
I differ from those who hold that since World War II a progressive moral develop-
ment has been at work in the resolution of conflicts. I maintain, instead, that internal
stability and entry or reinstatement into the international community after conflict
(and, in particular, after World War Two) were the results of political-economic
pressures. There has been a subordination of memories of past injustices on the part
of both victims and perpetrators of injustice who cannot afford to remain aloof from
the system of international political economy. The perpetrators might also desire to
rehabilitate the status of their ethnic group or country within the world community,
to regain recognition of their group or country as a valued member of the inter-
national community, or to demonstrate that their society is morally reputable and
responsible. But in the case of postwar Germany, these motives do not seem to have
been as strong as the politico-economic ones. Conversely, economic and political
considerations created a willingness on the part of Israel and worldwide Jewish
communities to engage in direct negotiations with West Germany.
During the first two or three years after the establishment of both the State of
Israel (1948) and the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), neither side contacted
31. Ibid., 265.
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the other. Mutual hatred was very high. Small groups of Jews here and there
fantasized about revenge on a mass scale, but the vast majority was preoccupied
with reconstructing their individual lives. Most Germans believed that the
destruction of European Jewry was carried out by someone else—for example,
by the regime without assistance from the public—and that Germans too had
suffered enormously.
By the early 1950s it became clear that the economy of Israel was in dire straits.
The country strained to absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees, experienced
severe production and export shortfalls, and suffered a major balance of payments
crisis. In addition, the state continually needed resources in its struggles with its Arab
neighbors, who were increasingly supported by the Soviet bloc.
West Germany, meanwhile, had to deal with a devastated infrastructure, severe
population losses, the management of millions of refugees from the East, and
twenty-billion dollars in reparations payments to the Allies. Although these
reparations obligations, decided upon at conferences in Potsdam, Yalta, and
Paris, were not as crushing as those imposed at Versailles after the First World War,
they still represented a hardship for the newly emerging West German state. The
Marshall Plan kept West Germany afloat economically, but that arrangement was
scheduled to end in 1952. It was in West Germany’s interest, therefore, to display a
cooperative attitude with the West during the numerous negotiations over its war
debt and also over arrangements governing steel production, currency exchange
rates, and occupation costs. West Germany may also have wished to rehabilitate
its moral standing in the eyes of other Western powers, but this does not appear to
have been uppermost in the minds of most government officials who were
worried about the impact of restitution payments on Germany’s already stag-
gering economy, and who also were concerned about Arab reaction to German
relations with Israel and, ultimately, about the prospects of German reunification.
Restitution discussions took place only after Chancellor Adenauer and a handful
of other government officials insisted that West Germany take financial, political,
and moral responsibility for its crimes, and after pressure was exercised from
representatives of Jewish organizations and Israel.32
32. The foregoing account is based on the following sources: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel
from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996); George Lavy, Germany
and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest (London: Frank Cass, 1996); Tom Segev, The Seventh Million:
The Israelis and the Holocaust, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993); James Knowlton
and Truell Cates, trans., Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the
Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993); Michael
Wolffsohn, Eternal Guilt? Forty Years of German-Jewish-Israeli Relations, trans. Douglas Bokovoy (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Nicholas Balabkins, West German Reparations to Israel (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971); Inge Deutschkron, Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition
(Philadelphia: Chilton Book Company, 1970); Ronald Zweig, German Reparations and the Jewish World:
A History of the Claims Conference (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987).
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The Jewish people had not been included among the recipients of reparations
worked out at Potsdam in 1945 or at any of the other conferences of the four
major victorious powers. The only provision was for $25 million in German assets
in neutral countries to be used to cover the losses of Jewish victims who had died
without heirs. Yet the European Jews were among those who had suffered most
from the Nazi regime, in every way. At issue were three sets of claims: individual
claims for restitution; Jewish institutional claims; and a collective claim on behalf
of the Jewish people.
For nearly two years, Dr. Noah Barou, vice-president of the British section
of the World Jewish Congress, patiently negotiated in private with West
German officials. In March of 1950, the West German Foreign Ministry agreed
in principle to collective indemnification. Because there were no official
channels between Israel and West Germany, Israel made a claim for about
$1.5 billion through diplomatic notes to the Allies. The amount was based on
estimates of the material losses of the European Jews and of the cost of
supporting those Jews who had moved to Israel. Israel’s figure was intended to
be a starting point for negotiations. The Allies took the position that Israel
as a sovereign state had to deal directly with the state of West Germany. The
Soviet Union did not respond at all to the portion of the note that was relevant
to East Germany.
Before negotiations could proceed, however, Israel insisted that Chancellor
Adenauer, in the name of the German people, issue a statement acknowledging
the wrongs done to the Jews. Adenauer, himself a devout Catholic, had no
objections to this. Indeed, he felt a moral obligation to try to rectify both material
and moral crimes. But large sections of the German government and population
opposed the proposed action. It took three months for the two states to agree on
a draft speech, which Adenauer finally delivered to the German parliament on 27
September 1951. In the speech, he acknowledged the unremitting shame that had
been brought upon Germany and the need to educate citizens about anti-
Semitism. The speech, however, fell short of being an explicit admission of guilt.33
After the negotiations had become public, the discussion turned to the
question of a permanent German diplomatic mission to Israel. According to an
editorial in the Jerusalem Post:
From every practical and contemporary point of view official relations with
Germany are necessary for the strengthening of the State. . . To sacrifice even
a part of Israel’s security and stability in order to reject Bonn’s proposal
indicates. . . a false estimate of the nature of diplomatic relations.34
33. Deutschkron, Bonn and Jerusalem, 37.
34. Lavy, Germany and Israel, 119.
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The contents of the editorial reflected profound disagreements within the
Israeli government. Speaker of the Knesset Yosef Sprinzak, for example,
refused to contemplate any relations with West Germany. He argued that
“the honor of the Jewish people precludes any acceptance of restitution from
Germany even if it were voluntarily and spontaneously offered.”35 Others
agreed with Prime Minister Ben Gurion and Foreign Minister Sharett, who
argued that the survival of Israel took priority over everything else and,
furthermore, that there might be a moral obligation to seek and benefit from
reparations payments:
All the sinister prophecies and scorn regarding the “naivete´” of the previous
coalition Government have now been fully disproved. The country’s entire
economy in all its branches, regardless of class and party affiliations, is
benefiting from these payments. What should be our overriding consideration
in this case? To immerse ourselves in memories and sacrifice the present and
the future to the past? Are not the survival of the State and the elevation of its
stature supreme injunctions for Jewish survival and Jewish honor both present
and future?36
During the negotiations, large street demonstrations took place, and Knesset
deliberations threatened to spin completely out of control. One historian
described this problem of reparations and negotiation with Germany as “perhaps
the single gravest crisis of Israeli democracy.”37
After much internal discussion in both governments and societies, recent
memory was subordinated to the requirements of political economy. The
documents concluding the negotiations among West Germany, Israel and the
Jewish Claims Conference were signed on the same day and in the same building
that Adenauer signed the document founding the European Coal and Steel
Community: Luxemburg City Hall, 10 September 1952.
To recapitulate: the development of postwar German-Jewish relations was
driven by problems of economic and political security rather than moral
considerations. Not all scholars will agree with this thesis. Elazar Barkan,
for instance, sees the German-Jewish reparations process as the first in a long
line of negotiations and agreements that continue today. They constitute a
new system of international morality alongside and often superseding power
politics.
35. Sachar, History of Israel, 465.
36. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett quoted in David Ben-Gurion, Israel: A Personal History, trans.
Nechemia Myers and Uzy Nystar (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, Inc., 1971), 442.
37. Sachar, History of Israel, 466. See also Ben-Gurion, Israel, 399.
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Although many Jews objected to whitewashing German guilt, those who
prevailed eventually negotiated partial “forgiveness” for partial restitution. The
outcome created a model for a new global morality.38
Having learned from experience, the Allies in 1945 did not impose reparations
upon Germany. Instead the United States accepted the burden of rebuilding
Europe and Japan and initiated the Marshall Plan. This introduced a novel
factor into international relations: Rather than hold to a moral right to exploit
enemy resources, as had been done previously, the victor underscored future
reconciliation . . .
Within this context of nonvindictiveness the modern conception of
restitution was born. . . . While the Allies’ Marshall Plan and their
nonretributive stance toward Germany may have been imaginative politics,
the innovative phenomenon in the German-Jewish agreement was that the
perpetrator compensated the victims on its own volition in order to facilitate
self-rehabilitation.39
Barkan, whose account is pervaded by the vocabulary of sin, repentance, and
forgiveness, contends that Jews and Germans faced a Faustian dilemma when
deciding whether to negotiate for material restitution. But from the Jewish and
Israeli point of view, there was no question of forgiveness at all. The Germans
understood this perfectly well and were not seeking forgiveness.40 Indeed, some
say that later, when Chancellor Willy Brandt dropped to his knees during a visit to
the former Warsaw Ghetto, he was quite aware that his request for forgiveness
would not be granted by descendants of the victims and that the gesture was
deeply unpopular in West Germany.41
The two governments hoped to secure and enhance their own economic and
political positions. They wanted to increase possibilities for economic and
political development through relations with each other and with other nations.
In the case of Israel, the government needed immediate economic and financial
aid for the absorption of immigrants from Europe as well as from Arab countries,
and for the running of the state. The material advantages for West Germany were
more long-term and complex. In addition to the economic issues tied to
occupation costs, currency-exchange rates, and steel production, West Germany
was interested in gaining a foothold in the power politics of the Middle East,
38. Barkan, Guilt, 26.
39. Ibid., xxiii (emphasis added).
40. Ben-Gurion, Israel, passim.
41. Raymond Cohen, “Apology and Reconciliation in International Relations,” in From Conflict
Resolution to Reconciliation, ed. Yaacov Bar Siman-Tov (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 187.
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where the former Allies were pursuing Saudi oil and were worried about Egyptian
nationalism and new circumstances in Iran, Turkey, and Yemen.42
The Soviet Union’s support for the United Nations’ plan to partition Palestine
and form the State of Israel proved to be momentary. Even though significant
numbers of Eastern European immigrants to Palestine were imbued with socialist
ideals, this was not enough to align Israel firmly on the Soviet side. This became
even truer because of the anti-Semitism evident in the arrest and show trials of
numerous Eastern European (Czech, Hungarian and Bulgarian) government
officials of Jewish origin.
Both the Federal Republic and Israel wanted to be aligned with the Western
power bloc, economically and politically. For Germany, this required suppression
of any lingering resentment over military defeat as well as the elimination of any
remnants of Nazi ideology and practice. It also required appearing to respond
adequately to the Israeli/Jewish request for restitution and reparations. Israel
needed to repress its immeasurable grief and anger for the sake national survival.
Nothing resembling collective repentance took place in Germany after the
war. To say that reconciliation in some sort of philosophico-moral sense, let alone
forgiveness with its religious connotations, was involved is simply wrong. Barkan’s
thesis—that the Federal Republic and Israel voluntarily entered the compensation
agreement and that it therefore was a new form of restitution—is true only in a
limited sense. Restitution and reparations took place within the context imposed
by the four major allies in 1945, and that context had its requirements.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that actual material restitution began locally, in
the four zones of occupied Germany. The first instance took place in the Russian
sector. Similar actions then occurred in the American sector. In both cases, the
military forces occupying the zone exerted pressure.43 I do not see how one could
claim that the German-Jewish restitution agreement was based more on moral
considerations than on power politics.
Implications for Other Cases
What emerged out of the German-Jewish negotiations was something less
than a new system of international morality based on recognition of identity,
forgiveness, and reconciliation. The scale of the German material reparations
effort may have been unprecedented, but so was the scale of the conflict. These
efforts at material reparation, again, were not initially complemented by any
broad, collective, or national repentance and apology (apologies were not
42. Cf. Geoffrey Barraclough, ch.vi in An Introduction to Contemporary History (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1967).
43. Zweig, German Reparations, 4.
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forthcoming until some thirty years later). To take postwar German-Jewish
relations as a model of political forgiveness or as a model for future conflict
resolution is to misunderstand what actually occurred and to foster exaggerated
hopes for social reconciliation elsewhere.
Nor is the case of South Africa as encouraging as it sometimes appears.
Although Tutu repeatedly states that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the willingness of many to forgive and to reconcile provided means to avoid
civil war and other forms of retribution in South Africa, the Commission was
in fact as much the effect as the cause of a relatively peaceful transition to a new
social order. The processes of negotiation for a new constitution and for
reconciliation in South Africa began with the concern of the (white) government
to maintain its power and meet large economic challenges. Plans for a truth-and-
reconciliation commission took shape only after Nelson Mandela had been set
free and elected President.
In other parts of Africa—for example Mozambique—the conscious decision to
set aside the past for present practical purposes, rather than to engage in public
procedures of repentance and forgiveness, resembled the German-Jewish case. In
general, the success of truth-and-reconciliation commissions in containing
violence appears to have been mixed.44 These examples call into question the
large claims about progress in international morality and the role of forgiveness in
that process.
I have tried, through a detailed description of the German-Jewish case, to
show that in general the notion of forgiveness was neither helpful nor necessary
for political and social reconstruction. I therefore differ not only from the
Christian perspective articulated by Tutu, but from the secularized view found in
the work of Arendt. Arendt deemed forgiveness essential not only to political life
but life in general; without it, no one would be able to act at all.45 She reasons
that without forgiveness we would be paralyzed by our awareness of the mistakes
of the past and by our fear of vengeance by the victims. “Forgiveness is the
opposite of vengeance, which acts in the form of re-enacting an original
trespassing.” Forgiveness, as Arendt conceives it, is a secularized version of Jesus’
teachings (“The fact that he made this discovery in a religious context. . .is no
reason to take it any less seriously. . .”). It is a spontaneous movement of love
toward the offender, which serves to “undo the past,” and is the remedy for the
“irreversibility of action.” The only alternative, on her view, is punishment.
But we have seen that this is not the case. Neither forgiveness, nor vengeance,
nor punishment was a central part of postwar Jewish-German reconstruction.
What proved important was a willingness on the part of the leadership and
44. Cf. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths.
45. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 236–43.
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representatives of both “parties” to subordinate extremely painful memories to
the perceived economic and political requirements of emerging democracies
(West Germany and Israel). Regardless of whatever else was going on in the
hearts and minds of the individual members of the German and Jewish
populations with respect to forgiveness, governmental and other leaders took
concrete measures that would begin to rectify at least part of the immeasurable
injustices that had occurred, and that would advance the efforts of both nations
to recover from the recent past. The two nations developed a limited yet ongoing
relationship, without full reconciliation in the sense of going forward as though
nothing had happened.
I recommend that the largely religious idea and vocabulary of forgiveness and
reconciliation be removed from political activity. This does not imply, however,
that all morality should be removed from politics. There are numerous moral
values which do not necessarily involve religious concepts and traditions:
keeping one’s word; truth-seeking; peace-seeking; solidarity; and so on.
One implication that does follow from the German-Jewish case is that material
reparations can and should be attempted. How this plays out in other specific
cases, however, is an enormous problem.46 It is difficult to know where to begin
when assessing economic losses incurred during mass atrocity or human-rights
violations. Moreover, sometimes it may be difficult to begin rectification through
material compensation without jeopardizing current needs for a minimally
decent society.
Ultimately, what I am suggesting is that though material restitution may be a
precondition for even minimal reconciliation and though efforts at political and
social reconstruction can be attempted in various ways, repentance, forgiveness,
and reconciliation are not essential components of reconstruction. They should
be removed from political life, not introduced or re-introduced into it.
Capacities for repentance and forgiveness vary from one person to another
(and perhaps one society to another). Although mourning, self-criticism, and
remembrance may take on public forms, it is preferable that they take place
between small groups and individuals without having to conform to the
expectations, prerogatives, or constraints of the state. Through a well-known
reversal of fortune, religious knowledges have become (secularist fears of
fundamentalism notwithstanding) subjugated knowledges, to use Foucault’s
phrase. Nonetheless, in matters of forgiveness and memory, they are less likely to
become too abstract and too lacking in cultural specificity than their secular-
political counterparts.
46. In addition to the literature cited in note 1, the following are conceptually helpful: Thomas
McCarthy, “Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in the USA: On the Politics of the Memory of Slavery,” Political
Theory 30 (2002): 623–48; Jeremy Waldron, “Superseding Historical Injustice,” Ethics 103 (October 1992):
4–28.
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Is “Bracketing” Memory a Form of Injustice?
The negotiations over restitution among Germany, Israel, and the world Jewish
community were not reconciliation in any religious or philosophical sense.
Nor did they involve an understanding or recognition of the identity of the other
and its needs. Explorations of identity and the past imbrication of cultures (the
German-Jewish symbiosis) came much later. What took place was the mutual
setting aside of memory for the purposes of economic and political security.
Bracketing memory and separating religious notions of repentance and
forgiveness from political life may be important for reconstruction, as opposed to
reconciliation. They do not, however, obviate the question of whether memory is
part of what we owe each other as human beings and as citizens. If self-esteem is
a primary social good, and if recognition of one’s historical narratives, memories,
and cultural traditions are vital to self-esteem, then it would seem that there is a
responsibility, on the part of citizens in a democracy, to see that every individual
or group has the means to acquire and nurture such self-esteem. There is, in other
words, an ongoing responsibility, beyond the generation of victims and per-
petrators, to ensure the continuation of self-esteem based on different memories,
narratives, identities, religious rituals, and so on. This is quite different from
pursuing a “shared” past.
In an essay on “Injustice and Collective Memory,” the political theorist Sheldon
Wolin has suggested that forgetfulness or deliberate suppression of memory—or
what I have called the bracketing of memory for security purposes—is a form of
injustice. He deplores the “social amnesia” which allowed the United States to
celebrate its bicentennial while apparently ignoring the historical wrongs done to
Native Americans and many other groups. Wolin regards Hobbes as the main
architect of this type of social amnesia:
Each of the three great contractualists insisted upon equal conditions of entry
for all parties of contract; each was offered the same guarantees; each was
subject to the same legal rules: Hobbes was the one writer who insisted not
only on a contract on equal terms, but they also had to agree to forget some
matters. . . . But what Hobbes was suppressing was not memory of personal
grievances but recollections. . .of historical and collective actions, actions of
kings, parliaments, judges, armies, civil war. A necessary condition of social
amnesia was that men dehistoricize themselves. . . . The trade-off is equality
for remembrance.47
47. Sheldon Wolin, “Injustice and Collective Memory,” in his The Presence of the Past: Essays on the
State and the Constitution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 37–38.
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In the arena of international relations—as opposed to national politics—
individual states remain sovereign. But they are not equal, and international law
provides unreliable guarantees. In such circumstances, it would be too much to
say that equality is the trade-off for remembrance. Rather, as the German-Jewish
case shows, it is security and participation in the world system of political
economy that is the trade-off for remembrance. It was Israel’s need to enter into
the dynamics and conditions of “pure power,” as Wolin would put it, which led it
to enter into relations with Germany, despite the Holocaust.
Wolin makes a mistake in linking the suppression of memory with injustice.
The bracketing of memory by victims or by their representatives and descendants
for the vital purpose of security can be distinguished from the suppression of
memory by perpetrators, by the state, or by society for the purposes of repression
and control of minorities. Bracketing should also be distinguished from sheer
ignorance or indifference. Moreover, the bracketing of memory does not pre-
clude private remembrance of a regular or ritualized nature. It may not even
involve, as Avishai Margalit has put it, a letting-go of resentment, in the sense of not
reliving a certain emotion every time a certain memory is evoked.48 But bracketing
does involve an ability to control that resentment and related emotions so as to
enable the priority of common security or welfare to be realized.
The idea of bracketing memory for politico-economic purposes may suggest
to some readers that people will be left with low levels of self-esteem or cultural
identity. I see this problem at a public level as one of the costs of engaging in a
constitutional democratic order, in which the value or principle of well-being for
all takes precedence over the perfection of identity and its recognition. This does
not mean, however, that individuals and groups may not strive to enhance their
own modes of memory and to arrive at an enriched recognition of the identity of
others. Nor does it mean that states can entirely ignore inequalities of opportunity
for individual or group self-esteem and recognition. Debates on the obligation to
remedy the effects of past crimes or discrimination, efforts to rectify past
injustices, should take place. And these debates sometimes fall to subsequent
generations rather than to victims and perpetrators themselves.
Those who disclaim any responsibility to do this (because they weren’t there
when the wrong was done, or had no direct or even indirect guilt or respon-
sibility) are not only making a claim about temporal limitations on responsibility
to rectify injustices. They are also embracing an underlying methodological
individualism. They are resisting any notion of shared social responsibility, which
48. Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). A view of
social reconciliation which is somewhat similar to mine may be found in Charles L. Griswold,
Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), especially 192ff.
Griswold distinguishes between political apology and forgiveness. The former can facilitate a minimal
level of cooperation, the latter involves “deep reunion, love and harmony.”
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may be thought to arise from the political project of constructing democracy.
How such a notion of shared responsibility to rectify injustices might be defended
is beyond the scope of this paper.49 I will only say that I subscribe to the view that
rectifying injustice is indeed part of what we owe to each other in terms of
primary social goods.
I have argued that the principal proponents of reconciliation view world history
as a moral-philosophical narrative ultimately founded upon Christian-Hegelian
ideas. They envision an ideal end-state in which, in Hegel’s phrase, “all griefs are
healed,” judgments are discarded as obstacles, and no scars are left behind. This is
an ideal for metaphysical selves and of a metaphysical form of solidarity. This is not
an ideal for real people, who are capable of suffering indelible wounds and who
have only a limited capacity for repentance and forgiveness.
What would be preferable, in my view, would be to encourage and to speak
only of practical goals in reconstruction. Moral judgments and cultural identities
are neither abandoned nor “sublated” into some imaginary universal state or spirit,
but remain constrained by the requirements of common if not communal life and
peace. This is an approach which acknowledges the right of all individuals and
groups to preserve their memories of injustice while participating in the ongoing
construction of a secure, fair, and liberal society or international order.
To say that there has been some movement toward these aims since the end of
World War II is not to believe one has discerned the emergence of either idealized
reconciliation processes or a rapidly developing moral world community. I close
with an observation from Immanuel Kant who, though often read as an exponent of
an ideal of international peace and justice, may have been closer to the position I
have been advancing. He wrote in the renowned essay Perpetual Peace:
On the other hand, nature also unites nations which the concept of
cosmopolitan right would not have protected from violence and war, and
does so by means of their mutual self-interest. For the spirit of commerce
sooner or later takes hold of every people, and it cannot exist side by side with
war. And of all the powers (or means) at the disposal of the power of the state,
financial power can probably be relied upon most. Thus states find themselves
compelled to promote the noble cause of peace, though not exactly from
motives of morality.50
49. In addition to the topic of material reparations, discussed by McCarthy and Waldron (note 46),
the topic of recognition and reconciliation of identities in a multicultural society is discussed by Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, “The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions,” in Truth v. Justice: The
Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
50. Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet. 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 114, emphasis in the original.
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